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FOREWORD 
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief 
of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of 
professional· interest to officers of the naval service. 
The thoughts and opinions. expressed in this publication are 
-those , of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy 
Department or of the Naval War College. 
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.. PRESENT AND FUTURI; NATIONAL OBJECTIVES 
An · Address delivered by 
Bernard M. Baruch 
at the Naval · War College 
March 31, 1950 
Admiral Beary has asked me to talk to you on the subject 
of strategy. I certainly ani not equipped to discuss strategy as it 
relates to specific weapons or to the role of the different services 
or even to the. military importance of the atomic bomb. Since 
World War One, however, I have studied the inter-relationships of 
war and peace and some of my thoughts in this regard may in­
terest you. 
A . little more than a year ago, one member of the Senate 
Arm�d Services Committe� came to me in great agitation. He had 
heard that a defense budget of $30 billions was being prepared 
and he was frightened at what it would do to our economy. He 
asked my advice as to what policy should be followed in the matter 
of defense expenditures fo� the cold war; 
My reply was that we had to avoid panicky over-spending. 
- Instead we had to learn to pace ourselves in relation to the Russians
and the threat of war. We dared not over-spend on armaments to
where .our social, political and ·economic system might be wrecked
-that would suit the enemy as much as to defeat us militarily. Yet
we dared not maintain so feeble a defense establishment as to in­
vite aggression, as it did in Hitler's time.
With each 8'ear· of added cold war attrition, this concept of 
"pacing ourselves" · becomes more vital:- and also more difficult 
to carry out. The longer the cold_ war drags, the more essential it 
Mr. Baruch, el<ler statesman, financier and philanthropist, was Chair­
man of the War Industries Board in World War I. During World 
War II, he servjld as adviser to President Roosevelt and War 
Mobilization Director James H. Byrnes. 
RESTRICTED 1 
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 5, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss5/1
becomes to husband our resources, yet the greater grows the 
danger that the cold war may erupt into a hot, shooting war. In 
the past few years, while the whole world has been digging itself 
out from under the destruction and exhaustion of the last war, no 
potential aggressor has had the material means for waging another 
war. But what will happen when the potential aggressor has re­
covered his strength and there still is no peace? 
Now by "pacing ourselves" I do not mean that we should 
undertake to match Soviet armament, plane by plane, tank by tank, 
man for man. On that I am completely in accord with General 
Omar Bradley. However, I do feel that we must vigilantly watch 
the over-all degree of Soviet mobilization for war and that we 
· dare not permit too great a variance with our own mobilization­
or we risk war.
By "pacing ourselves" I also mean that we must preserve a 
flexible attitude· towards our problems of defense and not freeze 
rigidly on too narrow a strategy. For example, I would not think 
it wise to base our defense exclusively on our ability to retaliate 
against the enemy's cities and industries. To prevent aggression, 
it is true that we must be able to retaliate instantly and that the 
enemy should know we can do it. Still, I am not sure that the 
"next war" -May it never come-will begin with flagrant open at­
tack upon this country. It seems to me quite likely that the test 
may come in the more subtle form of civil war-probably. in Ger­
many. In event of such a civil war, the situation might be such 
that it would be unwise to retaliate against the enemy directly and 
yet we would not dare stand by impotent. 
In short, I believe our defensive strategy must not only an­
ticipate the danger of another all-out war, but that of civil war as 
well. 
2 RESTRICTED 
RESTRICTED 
5
Naval War College: May 1950 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
As a matter of fact, it might be said this state of civil war 
already exists, that that is what the cold war really is, neither peace 
nor total war, but a succession of civil conflicts, more or less violent, 
wherever the Soviets can foment such strife. In Western Europe 
we have managed to achieve a sufficient degree of stability to pre­
vent open civil war. In Greece, after a bloody and costly struggle, 
the civil war appears to have been decided in the favor of the dem­
ocracies. In China we have suffered a truly serious defeat. 
That defeat has stirred a good deal of public discussion of 
whether we are losing the cold war. Certainly there is sufficient 
reason to feel that what has been done so far is inadequate. 
A few weeks ago, the Secretary of State called for "total 
diplomacy". Undoubtedly that is what is needed. Undoubtedly 
that is not what we have. 
Although the cold war is now dragging into its sixth year 
and despite the enormous resources we have expended, we still 
have not faced up to what the total peace-waging requires. We 
still stagger from crisis to crisis, with the initiative left to the 
enemy. We still treat each country as a separate problem, in­
stead of as part of a unified global strategy. 
For several years, now, I have been pressing, both publicly 
and privately, for this over-all global strategy, which would do for 
the peacemaking what our global strategy did during the recent 
war. To devise this global strategy I have urged that a central 
"think body" be created, to survey the whole of the cold war, re­
examining our policy and advising the President. 
Recently my good friend Senator Vandenberg proposed a 
somewhat similar group. I arri afraid, though, that the re-evalua­
tion of American policy he proposes would not go far enough­
his letter talks only of political and economic policy. Then, I do 
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not believe that a special committee, which would study the prob­
lems of ECA, report and then disband, is enough. What is needed 
is a non-partisan gr<Yu.p which will stay on the job until the cold 
war is won, a group which would sit in continuous deliberation on 
the whole of the peace-waging, serving as a central point of de­
cision, weighing all the many commitments pressed upon us, guid­
ing the best disposition of our strained resources, determining 
where in the world we are to fight a more holding action and where 
we can achieve a decisive break-through-and at what effort. 
In short,. what is needed is a General Staff for Peace. 
To cite only one instance of the sort of decisions now going 
by default-take Indo China. For tranquility to be restored to that 
Asian outpost the civil war now raging there will have to be brought 
to a victorious conclusion. Where are the French to obtain the 
necessary military supplies? It has been suggested that the French 
government use the materiel now being allocated to it under the 
Military Aid Program. But the aim of that Military Aid Program 
was to strengthen Western Eur-9pe against possible Soviet ag­
gression. Are we then to weaken Western Europe for some half-
hearted and possibly ineffective action in the Orient? 
Sooner or later we must expect a showdown over Germany­
since Germany cannot be expected to remain divided indefinitely. 
Are we pacing ourselves so that we will be ready for that show­
down when it comes ? Or will it find us as unprepared as we now 
seem to be to deal with conditions in the Far East? 
Are we to continue to spread ourselves too thin, unable to 
achieve decision anywhere? Hasn't the time come for the expen­
diture of sufficient resources to force a decision somewhere? 
If our diplomacy is to be truly "total", we must mobilize 
not only public opinion but the necessary economic, military and 
4 
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political resources, applying those resources on the basis of an over­
all global strategy. That is not now being done. I doubt that it 
will be done unless some central peacemaking agency is created. 
I began urging.the formation of such a GHQ for Peace even 
before the last war ended. In memoranda to President Roosevelt 
I pointed out that America's greatest power in the peacemaking 
would lie in the fact that we would emerge from the war with our· 
enormou� productive power untouched by devastation. No country, 
in the world would be, able to raise its living standards without 
American help. Our problem would be how to bring this great 
productive power to bear upon the peacemaking as decisively as 
we had done in the warmaking. 
I proposed to President Roosevelt that an Advisory · Peace 
Council be created consisting, of the secretaries of State, War, 
Navy, Treasury, the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, 
the Foreign Economic · Administrator and Harry Hopkins. This 
body was to consider all peace questions, formulating their recom­
mendations for policy, which were to go to the President for his 
final decision. This Council was also to have a small staff of its 
own under the direction of a Counsellor who enjoyed the complete 
personal confidence of the President. 
Roosevelt lik_ed the idea and said he would put it into effect. 
He told me he would name James F. Byrnes as its chairman and 
Judge Samuel Rosenman, as the Counsellor. Judge Rosenman was 
then in Europe and the President put off establishing the Council 
until Rosenman should return. Shortly after that, President 
Roosevelt sent me to London to discuss some matters with Winston 
Churchill and while there I told Judge Rosenman about the Presi­
dent's plan. A few days later we received the tragic news that the 
President had died. 
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When I returned from London, I repeated the suggestion for 
this peace council to President Truman and he said he would create 
the body. But the idea got shunted off. 
"Possibly the reason was the creation of the National Secur­
ity Council, which, I was told, was modelled upon the earlier sug­
gestion of an Advisory Peace Council to the President. Unfortunate­
ly if that is what the Security Council was intended to be, it hasn't 
wor}ced out that way. The members of the Security Council are over­
worked; its membership needs broadening; its functioning must be 
reorganized to come to grips with the problems of achieving a de­
cision in the peacemaking, instead of avoiding decision as has hap­
pened too often in the past. 
A revitalized Security Council could do the job but it would 
have to be brought under the direction of a man of the stature of 
General Marshall, and enlarged with men who have no other busi­
ness but this. To win the cold war, there must be one group which 
does nothing but think, work, plan-live and breathe-the cold war. 
The first task of this revitalized Security Council might well 
be to re-examine the whole situation to determine what would be 
required to win the cold war and to plan a step-by-step strategy for 
taking the initiative in gaining peace. Were that done, by the sort 
of body I envision, I believe its recommendations would command 
the support of the public and Congress. 
Without such a central peacemaking agency "total diplo­
macy" will remain a mere phrase. 
If the American people are told what must be done, honestly 
and frankly, they will see the peace through. On the other hand, 
if the tactics adopted are to lure them into ever deeper involvement, 
bit by bit, without ever facing up to what the total peacemaking re­
quires, then there will always be doubt of their willingness to drift 
down a road which has no end. 
6 RESTRICTED 
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While this General Staff for Peace is our first need, it is not 
our only need. For such a body to function effectively, it must 
have the best possible intelligence. How are we to pace ourselves in 
relation to the Russians unless we know what they are up to? 
It is not easy to figure the Russians out. Still, I am not 
prepared to accept the viewpoint of Russia as an unfathomable en­
igma behind an impenetrable iron curtain. Certain factors about 
the _Soviet Government should make it quite predictable. 
As Dictators, the Soviet leaders can act without consulting 
their people and are therefore capable of unloosing surprises. But 
the Soviet Union is also a planned economy. Everything that hap­
pens in Russia is supposed to measure up·to a Five Year Plan, which, 
in turn, is broken down into yearly plans. The Plan doesn't always 
work out in practice. Still it must reflect the judgments, decisions 
-and motives--0f the Soviet leaders.
The Kremlin's calculations as to when war is likely-twenty, 
ten, five, two years from now, or even sooner�must be embodied in 
Soviet planning, in how critically short materials are divided be­
tween immediate military needs and the expansion of Soviet in­
dustry, in the rate of purchases abroad of materials the Soviets 
lack at home and so on. 
Russia. being a dictatorship, none of these things can hap­
pen accidentally. Each action must reflect some decision taken in 
the Kremlin. Each action reflects some caluculated risk which the 
Soviet government is taking. By putting together all of the bits 
and pieces, we should have an adequate basis for judging Russia'i:; 
intentions as to war or peace. 
Studying the Soviet economy in this w:ay should also give us 
some means of checking the extravagant reports current as to Rus., 
sia's military strength. One day these reports picture the Soviet 
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Union building a gigantic air force; then it is a terrific fleet of sub­
marines; then it is tanks, and ground forces; then it is a navy. But 
Russia can hardly be a great land power, a great naval power, a 
great air power, a great atomic power, all at the same time. We 
know how difficult and expensive it is for this country to maintain 
our defense establishment and Russia has infinitely less resources at 
her command than we do. 
In the course of "pacing ourselves" we are always likely to 
lag somewhat behind the Soviets in terms of readied military 
· strength. In itself this is not necessarily alarming since our enor­
mous potential for war also serves as a deterrent against aggression.
If overt Soviet aggression }}as been prevented these last few years,
it has not been solely because of our possession of the atomic bomb.
The Soviet leaders have also been mindful of the fact that at the
peak of the last war the United States produced nearly as many air­
planes, tanks, guns and other war materiel as the rest of the world
combined.
We can be sure that the Soviet leaders have not forgotten 
that fact. But we can also be sure that the Soviet leaders have not 
forgotten that it todk us nearly two and a half years to convert our 
gigantic productive energies from peace to war. 
This time gap in our mobilization is our gravest source of 
peril. It is the weakness around. which any enemy must base its · 
war plans. No nation in the world will attack a mobilized America. 
The only strategy any enemy can have is to attempt to overwhelm 
us during that "too little and too late" period while our military 
power is still "on order." 
That is the reason why I have never ceased urging the 
prompt enactment of a stand-by mobilization plan, which would 
insure the swiftest possible marshalling of. all our resources in case 
8 RESTRICTED 
RESTRICTED 
11
Naval War College: May 1950 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
of attack. A ready.:.t.o-go mobilization plan should be put into law 
now, to go into instant operation upon joint proclamation by Con­
gress and the President. To wait until war has begun and bombs 
are actually falling before we begin to legislate is to invite disaster. 
Nor is anything to be gained by delay. What needs to be 
done is as well known today as it ever will be. The question is 
not what should be done, but whether we will do what we know must 
be done, or wait until disaster is upon us. 
Included in this stand-by mobilization law should be: 
An impartial selective service law, with a work-or-fight 
clause. 
A readied civilian defense. 
The elimination of profiteering. 
The power to shut down less essential production to give 
military needs priority. 
Rationing of scarce essentials. 
Much higher taxes. 
A ceiling on all prices, rents, wages and other costs to pre­
vent the inflation which could wreck any mobilization. 
These laws would not specify the quantities of weapons to 
be produced-that must be kept secret and be constantly revised. 
Their objective would be to organize the nation so that if war came, 
no time would be lost in meeting any military demands. May I also 
emphasize that the whole program is needed, not merely parts of it . 
. Under political temptation, some may seek to leave prices uncon­
trolled, or . to soften other mobilization measures here and there. 
That was done in the last war, at what a terrible cost not alone in 
inflation but in lengthening the war and with it the slaughtering 
and the maiming ! 
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To sum up there seem to me to be four major essentials 
of. a successful cold war strategy: 
1. A military establishment which includes not only an im­
mediate available striking force of sufficient power to in­
sure prompt retaliation and deter aggression, but one
flexible enough to deal with possible civil war abroad.
2. A ready-to-go mobilization plan which will insure the
swiftest mobilization of all our resources-men, money
and materials-in case we or our allies are attacked.
3. An effective intelligence agency to provide the informa­
tion needed to pace ourselves in relation to the Soviets
and the threat of war.
4. A general staff for peace, to re-evaluate the whole of the
peacewaging and to formulate a global strategy which
will achieve a decision for peace.
One final thought, which I always like to leave with a group 
such as yours. In the past, the American people tended to deny 
the realities of power and to think that peace could be preserved 
by mere moral pronouncements, by "outlawing" war and so on. 
Today, there is general realization that peace is impossible unless 
supported by military strength. Still, although aware of this fact, 
many Americans are uneasy about it. They would like to forget 
their dependence on military power, and so there is much grumbling 
about the so-called "militarization of American life" and of the 
"military running the country". 
Don't let this grumbling disturb you. Yours is the right 
to be proud of your profession. You have brought imperishable 
glory to America. More important, you have never failed this 
country in your role as the guardian and protector of our liberties. 
10 RESTRICTED 
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What makes" a police state is not the existence of the police 
but the absence of law behind the police. What makes a military 
state is not the existence of the military but that the military con­
stitute themselves the state. The American soldier-and by that 
I mean you naval men as well as the members of the other serv­
ice�has never attempted to be a law unto himself. I resent any 
attempt to force you into a second-class citizenship. I, . for one, 
want, to acknowledge the great debt we all owe you. 
I will close with a quotation from "England's Answer'' by 
Rudyard Kipling. 
"Go to your work and be strong, halting not in your ways, 
, Baulking the end half-won for an instant dole of praise. 
Stand to your work and be wise--certain of sword and pet!, 
Who are neither children nor Gods, but men in a world of men !" 
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RESTRICTED 
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS 
A lecture delivered by 
Rear Admiral George L. Russell, U. S. N. 
at the Naval War College 
on April 11, 1950 
It is a distinct pleasure for me to have the opportunity of 
addressing members of the Naval War College this morning. Some 
months ago I received the invitation from Admiral Beary, who 
suggested that an appropriate topic would be "Recent Decisions 
in International Law". In the time which is allotted to me I will 
do well to do more than hit some of the high spots. 
I am aware of the fact that the Naval War College con­
ducts a correspondence. course in International Law. I plead 
guilty to not having taken it myself, but it is my belief that those 
who have been fortunate enough to have had the course will be 
more likely to get the right answers should they find themselves 
in a position where. it will fall to them to apply the principles of In­
ternational Law to a given situation. To the extent that the corres­
pondence courses and that portion of the curriculum at the College 
may be supplemented by up-to-date decisions, I propose to discuss a 
few of the cases that have come to me for opinion during the last 
couple of years. In addition, I shall take the liberty of expanding 
the subject matter to cover not only recent decisions but also re­
cent international activities which have a bearing on it. 
International Law is probably most unsatisfactory to those 
of us who have a leaning towards such exact subjects as mathe­
matics. For that matter, all law is an inexact subject. Interna­
tional Law is particularly baffling to those who must rely on a 
written set of rules and regulations. The fact remains that the 
Rear Admiral Russell is Judge Advocate General of the Navy, a 
position he has held since 1948. From 1945-1948, he was Assistant 
Judge Advocate General. 
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field is· very broad indeed and that some phases of it have been 
reduced to such rules and regulations. The frustrating part of 
that is that it seems at times that there are no teeth in those 
. rules, no way to enforce them, and that therefore they a,re of 
little or no effect. This is not entirely true. We have, of course, 
seen numerous examples of nations wh�ch paid no attention to the 
solemn obligations of a treaty, and as of today, Soviet Russia and 
her satellites appear to ignore, among other things, the provisions 
of that branch of international law regarding_prisoners of war. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of establishing and admin­
istering a body of rules for international conduct, some 49 nations 
were represented at a conference at Stockholm, Sweden, to formu­
late new rules regarding the treatment of Prisoners of War and 
civilians during time of war. Soviet Russia was invited to the 
Stockholm conference but declined. to participate. When a sub­
sequent conference was held at Geneva last summer, however, 
Russia appeared and made the fiftieth nation to take part in the 
proceedings, thereby indicating that Russia is not so insensitive 
to world ·opinion as we have every right to deduce from the · ac­
tivities of the Kremlin. The Geneva Conference resulted in the 
adoption of four treaties based on the drafts drawn up at Stock­
holm. These treaties were: 
1. For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick of Armed Forces in the Field.
2. Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship­
wrecked Members of armed forces at Sea.
3. Treatment of Prisoners of War.
4. Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
The United States signed all four treaties. However, these 
treaties have not yet received the advice and consent of the 
Senate. 
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As you know, a milestone of international law was passed 
in 1949 upon the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. The 
basic purpose of the treaty is to maintain peace and security. It
is a collective measure within the framework of the U. N. Charter 
to safeguard the inherent right of self-defense in the event of an 
armed attack upon any of the signatories of the treaty. Twelve 
nations signed the treaty, The new obligations undertaken by 
the United States in the treaty are: 
1. To maintain and develop, separately and jointly and by
means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,
the individual and collective capacity of the parties to re­
sist armed attack (Art. 3) 
2. To consult whenever in the opinion of any of the parties,
the territorial integrity, political independence, or security
of any of them is threatened. (Art. 4)
3. To consider an armed attack upon any of the parties in the
North Atlantic Area an attack against them all (Art. 5),
and
4. In the event of such an attack, to take forthwith, individ­
ually and in concert with the other parties, such action as
the United States deems necessary, including the use of
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic Area (Art. 5).
The treaty expressly provides that all of its provisions must be 
carried out in accordance with the respective constitutional pro­
cesses of the parties, which means that our Congress still retains 
its power to declare war. However, the plenary power of the 
President to make use of armed forces is likewise retained. The 
provision of the United Nations Charter, wherever applicable, con­
trol every activity undertaken under the treaty. 
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Of more direct interest to you in this connection is the des­
cription of the North Atlantic Area. The word "area" is intended 
to cover the general region, rather than merely the North Atlantic 
Ocean in a narrow sense, and includes the western part of the 
Mediterranean as well as the North Sea and most of the Gulf of 
Mexico. The term North Atlantic Area is general in description, 
and this choice of words appears to have been deliberate. From our 
standpoint such general language appears preferable. I say this 
because it would seem inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty to 
provide that Article 5 would come into operation in the event of an 
attack, for example, upon ships or aircraft at a given point but 
not if the attack occurred a few miles away. If there should be 
any doubt as to whether or not an armed attack has taken place 
within the area specified in the treaty, each party would decide for 
itself, in the light of the facts surrounding the particular situation 
and the significance of the attack. 
Time does not permit further discussion of this important 
treaty of which· I have discussed but a few of the high points. As 
I indicated before, Article 3 of the Treaty embodies the principle of 
"continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid," which is the 
principle that forms the· basis of the European recovery program. 
It was felt by the Congress that the implementation of this prin­
ciple would not only help to deter aggression, but would go far, in 
the event all the efforts of the parties for peace should fail, to as­
sure the successful defense of the United States· and the collective 
strength essential for victory. And indeed shortly after the coming 
into force of the North Atlantic Treaty, Congress passed the Mu­
tual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Briefly, this Act author­
izes the President to furnish military assistance to nations who are 
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and who have requested such 
assistance. The Act further requires that the assistance must be. 
furnished in furtherance of the common defense of the North At-
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lantic area and to further the development of unified defense plans 
in order to realize unified direction and effort. 
In addition, military assistance is authorized to be furnfahed · 
to Iran, Korea, and the Philippines. . The law further permits as- · 
sistance to be furnished without payment except as may be provided 
in agreements concluded .with nations to whom assistance is furn­
ished. Assistance may take the form of procurement from any 
source and transfe� of any equipment,· materials, or services. No 
materials however, may be transferred out of military stocks, if the 
Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of· 
Staff, determines that such transfer would be detrimental to the na-
. ' 
tional security. The President is directed to enter into agreements 
with nations :receiving aid. Such agreements must contain pro-· 
visions (a) that the use of the .assistance will be in furtherance of 
the purposes of the Act; (b) that the. recipient nation will not 
transfer the equipment or materials, information, or services re­
ceived without the President's consent; (c) for the security of any 
article, service or information furnished; and (d) that the reciP­
ient nation will furnish reciprocal aid to the United States or other 
nations consistent with the United Nations Charter to further the 
purposes of the Act. 
The President· must terminate assistance when (a) the re­
cipient nation requests it be terminated, (b) if the President de­
termines it would be inconsistent. with the United States national 
interest or security Qf the United States or the purposes of the 
Act, or (e) if' the President finds that the continuation of assist-
. ance would be inconsistent with any United States obligation un•. 
der the United Nations Charter, or if the General Assembly of the 
United Nations finds continuance undesirable, or ·it may be termi­
nated by ·Congress. 
Among other things, the Act allows personnel of the armed 
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services to be detailed to non.,combatarit duty abroad, or to any 
agency, for the purposes of the Act. In carrying out the purposes 
of the Act, the Secretary of Defense has designated a Director 
of the . Office of Military Assistance in· his own off ice and· has desig­
nated a U. S. Military Representative for Military Assistance in 
Europe. The Secretary of Defense has established two basic guid­
ing principles in this program. First, that Military Assistance ac­
tivities will be accounted for separately from other activities of 
the Deprtment of Defense, and second, except for the specific re­
lationships esta.blished for overseas operations, by the agreements 
between the Department of Defense and the Department of State, 
all dealings with other Departments in this program will be to and 
through the office of the Secretary of Defense. 
I can say that as of today the program is developing rap­
idly and many officers from the three services have been detailed 
to Europe to assist the program. 
Of the many problems of international character handled 
by my office, the problems of jurisdiction are the most frequent. 
Due to the sending of thousands of our forces to foreign countries, · 
the problem of jurisdiction is· bound to be a recurring one. I will 
discuss th� problem of civil jurisdiction as distinguished from crim­
inal jurisdiction first. As you know, we naturally prefer to maintain 
exclusive jurisdiction over our forces · abroad, but exclusive juris­
diction in civil proceedings is a right that is very hard for us to claim 
on the basis of international precedent. Criminal jurisdiction has a 
logical basis in the assertion that if it is exercised by the sovereign 
of the territories visited, it might interfere with the personal free­
dom of the visiting sovereign's forces. This is not inherent in 
civil jurisdiction and therefore, although we claim it, we are on 
much poorer ground. The fundamental basis why foreign countries 
have been loathe to yield their nationals' rights to bring suit in 
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civil proceedings against our people has been that where damage is 
done with intent or by negligence, the people who have had dam­
age done to their property should have some recourse. 
We recognized this finally by our Foreign Claims Act of 2 
January 1942, as amended (31 U .. S. C. 224d), with which all of you 
should be familiar, because it may give you a way out in some such 
case. Under this Act where the loss of or damage or destruction 
to public or private property is caused by or incident to non-com­
bat activities of military and naval personnel, it may be adjudicated. 
The Congress contemplated the settlement of two types of 
claims under the provision of the Foreign Claims Act, namely, (1) 
claims based on acts or omissions involving a lack of reasonable 
care on the part of United States military personnel involved; and 
(2) claims arising out of authorized activities of United States
forces which are peculiarly military activities having little parallel
in civilian pursuits.
The Foreign Claims Act affords a ready means of promptly 
settling claims of inhabitants of ioz:eign countries, grounded on 
damage to their persons or property which is caused by Army, Navy, 
or Marine Corps forces. It is a statute which can be of great ·as­
Flis_tance to commanding officers of occupation or visiting units in 
friendly foreign countries. The speedy, on the spot, settlement of 
such claims, if within the punriew of the Foreign Claims Act, 
will do much to improve relatio,:,s during and after the occupation 
or visit.·. 
An example of what may happen when the Foreign Claims 
Act is not invoked is a case which arose in Lisbon where a couple of 
our sailors from a destroyer during a "good will" visit of an 
American naval squadron took a private automobile without the 
consent of the owner. While operating the car on a "joyride" they 
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collided with another privately owned automobile. They were ar­
rested and later turned over to their commanding officer on the 
promise that the resulting damages would be made good .. · The com­
manding officer effected a settlement of the claims with the assist­
ance of the Naval Attache by paying the claims out of the ship's 
welfare and recreation fund. When the claim for reimbursement of 
the ship's fund finally drifted into the Navy Department for pa_y­
ment under the Foreign Claims Act, we had to inform the Naval 
Attache that he, as well as any commanding officer had authority to 
convene a foreign claims commission and that it was his duty to 
do so in order that meritorious claims might be promptly settled 
and fri�ndly relations engendered thereby. In order to give wide 
dissemination to the existence and purpose of the Act, this case 
was reported in the Advance Copy of Court Martial Order No. 18 
of 25 August 1948. 
We have paid a variety of foreign claims under the authority 
granted by this Act. A brief summary of some of t�e claims paid 
will help you to visualize the wide range of the provisions of the 
Act. For instance, the claim for destruction by fire of a Chinese 
godown while occupied by units of the Marine Corps was paid even 
though the cause of the fire was undetermined. Injuries received 
as the result of unprovoked assaults and as a result of negligent 
operation of motor vehicles form the basis for payment in a large 
number of cases. The visits of our task forces to Australia seem 
to generate what we call "the Case of the Missing Cameras." The 
camera is checked by an Australian visitor as he boards one of our 
· men-of-war and cannot be located when he is ready to depart, Such
cases could be processed at once by a commission convened by the
commanding officer.
The Foreign Claims Act is available not only to the Army, 
but also through the Unification Act to the Air Force. The Army 
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and the Air Force, however, administer the Act through standing 
foreign claims commissions appointed by the Army and Air Force 
commanders in the field. Since the Navy moves around frequently, 
this procedure cannot be followed, but a foreign claims commission 
must be appointed by a commanding officer in the area where the 
injury occurs or in the locality where the claim is presented, de­
pending upon the expediencies of the situations. Since unification, 
the three services are attempting, with marked success, a coordina­
tion of policy in the handling .and treatment .of this class of claims. 
The point I wish to stress is that since Congress has pro­
vided a simple and efficient machinery for the prompt settlement 
of claims of this type, every effort should be made by the service 
concerned to employ the Foreign Claims Act whenever applicable 
in order to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of friend­
ly relations in foreign countries'. The prompt and proper employ­
ment of the Act will increase the prestige of the nation; the branch 
of the service and particular unit involved. 
Turning now to the matter of criminal jurisdiction over our 
forces abroad, I can say that it is a very legal and technical prob­
lem. Nevertheless I discuss it with you here because it is a 
question which will arise in the career of almost every officer and 
particularly, in command or staff functions. You will have 
questions of legal jurisdiction to decide, and some background for 
them is necessary. These jurisdictional questions are a natural re­
sult of two principles of· international law that very clearly con­
flict. The first principle is the theory of sovereignty which gives 
to a state exclusive jurisdiction over all persons within its boundary. 
The second principle is the rule that a state has exclusive juris­
diction over its armed forces. During the course of World War II 
we had stationed large contingents of our armed forces in foreign 
countries and it should be quite clear to all of you what a clash 
automatically occurs between these two principles in any such 
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case as that. The theories have been attempted to be reconciled 
by the general rule of international law that a sovereign, in permit­
ting armed forces of another sovereign to come into its territory, 
thereby automatically waived jurisdiction and granted jurisdiction 
to the visiting sovereign over its own forces. 
This view was set forth for the purpose of international 
law and for the purpose of American law in the well known case of 
Schooner Exchange v. McFadderii That case is a landmark of the 
law and is a fine example of Chief Justice Marshall's leadership in 
that particular field. Although the Schooner Exchange case in­
volved a French warship which was libeled in the port of Philadel­
phia, the basis for the various questions of jurisdiction and the 
American view on the subject came from a remark he made in the 
course of his opinion to the effect that "a case in which the sov-:­
ereign is understood to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction 
is where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through hi.:'1 
domain." That case became the precedent for a good many other 
cases, which I could cite to you for several minutes at least. 
The British wouldn't go along with that view. It is inter­
esting to note that one of the reasons undoubtedly has been that in 
most cases we haven't had visiting forces. We have had our forces 
visiting and for that reason we have always insisted that juris­
diction should lie with us. Whereas, in the case of the British, 
they are much mQre likely visited and therefore they have at­
tempted to cut down some of the jurisdiction of the visiting sov­
ereign who in the past war particularly, has been the United 
States. 
The British, before the last war, held that jurisdiction only 
extended in the quarters that were assigned to the visiting forces, 
for example, where we had a base. Within that base we could exer­
cise exclusjve jurisdiction over our people. Outside the base, if 
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they· got into trouble, they were subject to the British civil and 
criminal law. Fina.Uy, in order to minimize difficulties between 
Great Britain and the United States during the past war, Great 
Britain agreed without prejudice to yield to the American view. 
They did that by a statute known as the United States of Amer­
ica Visiting Forces Act, passed by Parliament oh 27 July 1942, 
which denied all jurisdiction to British Courts to try members of 
the United States armed forces. This question is still a live issue 
and some of you may very rapidly come in contact with it. A 
memorandum of the Secretary of State of the United States, dated 
February 5th, 1946, in reply.to an Aide Memoire (which is a diplo­
matic letter) from the British Embassy, points out the clear con­
flict between the British and the American theories of jurisdic­
tion and amends the American view (and this, I might add, is 
something which is important as stating our present position), in 
that, "Pending further experience, this government did not ob­
ject to the exercise by British courts of jurisdiction of civil pro­
ceedings involving members of the armed forces of the United 
States provided no attempt was made to exercise any control over 
their persons and provided further that judgment was not rendered 
against them when they were prevented by official duties from de­
fending the action". About two years ago the British government 
raised the question of repealing the Visiting Forces Act on the 
grounds that there were not enough United States armed forces 
personnel in England to warrant retention of the Act. Due, how­
ever, to the recent increase in military personnel, particularly Air 
Force personnel, in England, the Secretary of Defense strongly 
urged the retention of the Act, and no doubt in these critical days, 
no further attempt will be made to repeal it. 
The question of jurisdiction is sharply pointed up in the Brit­
ish colonies where leased bases are located. As you know, we ob­
tained 99 y,ear leases to establish bases in certain British colonies 
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in return for the transfer of 50 destroyers to the British several 
months prior to our ,entry into World War II. All questions of 
jurisdiction were supposed to be settled by Article IV of the Leased 
Bases Agreement which, provid.es for American jurisdiction in the 
first instance over military offenses committed by members of our 
forces either within or without the leased areas. It provides for 
American jurisdiction in the. first instance of offenses committed 
by British nationals where the offense is committed and the of­
fender apprehended within the .leased area, and American jurisdic­
tion in the first instance in the case of nationals of other countries 
where the offense is committed in the leased area regardless of 
. where the off ender is apprehended. 
Three points should be noted with regard to cases pertaining 
to jurisdictional questions as a matter of practical policy for the 
officer in the field: (1) The first one is the Military Establishment's 
policy of adherence to the American doctrine of extraterritoriality 
for our forces unless modified by agreement with the nation con­
cerned, and, only in such case in strict adherence to the terms of 
the modifying agreement. (2) The second point is that where proper 
authority exists, the implementation of existing international in­
struments by working arrangements with local authorities, may be 
approved as long as you don't fly in the,,f ace of international rules 
and policies of the Military Establishment. It makes for smooth 
working out of local affairs. (3) The third point is the necessity 
that, in a case of any implementation, the Departm�nt concerned· 
. be kept fully advised in the matter, particularly if the questions 
are, as they are apt to be, eventually referred to them. 
Now with regard to jurisdiction in other countries. Our 
military jurisdiction within base areas, our own bases or our own 
ships, has been universally conceded as long as we are ln the area 
or on the ships. The main problem ·always involves jurisdiction 
over non-military criminal offenses committed outside of our bases 
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and ships. This is especially true where there is damage don.e to 
nationals of a foreign country, either physical injury or property 
damage. Negotiations to meet these various problems are constant-
ly being conducted. 
Following the Confederation of Newfoundland and Canada on 
March 31, 1949, the Canadian Government requested changes in 
. the Leased Base Agreement with Newfoundland with respect to its 
taxation, customs exemptions, postal services, and jurisdiction pro­
visions. Negotiations are still proceeding on the requested revisions. 
Of primary interest are the negotiations pertaining to the juris­
diction provision ofthe Leased Base Agreement with Newfoundland. 
In the view of the· Canadian Government this provision was unde­
sirable because it gave to U. S. courts jurisdiction over Ganadian 
citizens and did not adequately protect the position of Canadian 
civil courts. Our position has been that while the provision does 
give u: S. service courts some jurisdiction over British or Canadian 
nationals, it requires that the trial of such persons must be before 
a United States civil court sitting in the leased area.· Since we have 
never maintained such courts within any of the leased areas and· 
since there is no present intention of maintaining such courts, the 
result is that no Canadian nationals have been tried, nor is there 
any likelihood that any would be .. 
Another point of difl'erence is that the Agreement was 
thought to deal with civil as well as with criminal jurisdiction and 
the Canadian Government had the impression that our service per­
sonnel had immunity from the civil jurisdiction of the Territory. 
Our position is that the provision deals exclusively , with criminal 
jurisdiction. The Canadian Government. also requested revision of 
the jurisdiction provision of the Agreement because it conferred 
exclusive jurisdiction upon U. S. authorities in some respects. Our 
position is that from the words "The United States shall have the 
absolute right in the first instance" to take jurisdiction does not 
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preclude the local courts from exercising jurisdiction subsequently 
in certain specified types of offenses. All of which is to say that our 
Government takes the position that all jurisdiction is concurre�t, 
although in certain indicated cases the United States has the right 
to exe:r:cise jurisdiction in the first instance. We can all watch with ·) 
interest the final result of these negotiations. 
We now have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over naval and 
military personnel in Brazil, and in Uruguay, rec�gnized by the 
Supreme Courts of the particular countries involved.. In Egypt and 
with the China Nationalist regime, we have similar exclusive juris:- · 
diction by agreements which have been reached through diplomatic 
channels. With some countries, we have agreements like · the one 
with Denmark for the defense of Greenland by which we exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction over any acts by personnel, that are concerned 
directly with. the defense of the bases there. 
The problem is somewhat different in the Philippines. The 
Philippine Islands were given their independence on July 4, 1946, 
and the RepubHc of the Philippines is now, as you know, an inde­
pendent nation. The Philippines present. no exception to the adol­
escent experience of all states in that, when first embarking- upon 
an independent career, they experienced severe ·growing pains and 
their national passions ran high. Shortly after the Philippines 
achieved their independence, a military bases agreement was · ne­
gotiated .with the Philippine Government. The . Military Bases 
Agreement of March 14, 1947 grants to the United States the right 
to retain the use of certain bases listed in the agreement for a period 
of 99 years. Some of these bases, such as the naval reservations at 
Su.hie Bay and Sangley Point, were reserved to the United States by 
an executive order of the President issued sometime before World 
.War II, and the Navy Department has consistently maintained that 
title thereto was never relinquished to the Philippine Government by 
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the Treaty of General Relations of July 4, 1946. While some of the 
provisions of the Philippine Military Bases Agreement of March 14, 
1947 are somewhat similar to those of the United Kingdom Leased 
Bases Agreement of March 27, 1941, the jurisdiction articles thereof 
differ in many respects. Under Article XIII of the Military Bases 
Agreement, the Philippine Government yielded to the United States 
jurisdiction over three classes of offenses: (a) those committed by 
any person within the base, except where the off ender and off ended 
parties are both Philippine citizens not members of the United 
States Armed Forces on active duty, or the offense is against the 
security of the Philippines and the offender is a Philippine citizen; 
(b) those committed outside the bases by a member of the United
States Armed Forces and the off ended party is also a member of
the armed forces; and, (c) those committed outside the bases by a
membe.r of the United States Armed Forces against the security
of the United States. The Philippine Government, however, re­
served jurisdiction over all other offenses committed outside of the
bases by any member of the United States Armed Forces.
Another problem which is active in the field of international 
law has to do with maritime jurisdiction and territorial waters. As 
you know, the United States has always asserted the "freedom of 
the seas" proposition, and has adhered to the three-mile 
limit as the maximum extent of territorial waters. How­
ever, other nations have in recent months sought to extend the limits 
of their territorial waters. For instance, Yugoslavia claims a six 
mile limit, Costa Rica extended its protection and control over a zone 
extending 200 nautical miles from the continental coasts including 
off-shore islands, and the Russians have asserted a 12 mile limit. 
During the war the United States by Executive Order created de­
fensive · sea areas, which extended more than three miles from 
shore, but these were never challenged, since · it was considered 
legal to create such areas for our national security. And we have 
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been very careful to reiterate the general rule of international law 
that the defensive sea areas in no way had the effect of extending 
sovereignty over our territorial waters beyond the three mile · 
limit. 
Two or three years ago a diplomatic incident occurred be­
tween the United States and Russia involving international law 
and the Navy Department, which serves to illustrate one of the 
many problems of territorifl waters. The Russians complained 
that their territorial waters had been violated by Navy planes in 
the Alaskan sector. You may recall from your history that when 
. Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867, a dividing line was 
drawn on the chart in the seas between Russia and Alaska. · It 
was the intent of the treatymakers that all land to the eastward 
of this line should belong to the United States, and to the west­
ward to Russia. An official protest was received from the Soviet 
government that a Navy plane had circled the Soviet ship TEMP 
in a position which they claimed plotted to the westward of this 
line and was therefore a violation of their territorial waters. The 
position, when plotted from information received from our aviators, 
turned out to be slightly to the eastward of the line and the !De­
partment of State submitted to the Navy Department a proposed 
reply to the Soviet government which stated that fact without 
more. The Navy Department took the position, however, that 
our retort should not be based on this premise, but rather on the 
fact that even the position given by the Soviet government was 
well outside the limit of territorial waters of the Soviet Union 
as recognized by established rules of international law. .Accord­
ingly, the official reply pointed out that since the position of the 
Soviet ship was 35 miles to the northeast of Cape Wellen it was 
upon the high seas and thus not subject to restriction. It was 
our fear that the Soviet government might construe the first dis­
patch to mean that we acknowledged that they had sovereignty 
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over all waters to the westward of this imaginary line of demar­
cation. The fact that the Soviet government had, in 1926, issued 
a decree that they intended to exercise sovereignty over all land 
areas in ,a sector to tlie northward of the Soviet Union and extenq­
ing to the north pole influenced. our decision. This Government 
has never recognized the sector theory of sovereignty of polar areas 
either in the Arctic or the Antarctic. 
The latest territ<;>rial waters problem has· given us consider­
able trouble in the Far East� On June 25, 1949, the Chinese Na­
tionalist Government proclaimed a !'port closure" of certain Chinese 
ports inc.luding. Shanghai. The United States and Great Britain
. refused to recognize the port closure on the grounds that it was il­
legal since the Nationalists were trying to close ports over which 
they had no effective control. However, the presence of Nationalist· 
war vessels in the Yangtze Estuary demonstrated that it was able 
to effectively control the egress and ingress of vessels operating 
in the Communist held port of Shanghai. Apparently our own 
State Department people reasoned that to recognize the port 
closure would be tantemount to recognizing a "blockade", although 
there is a distinct difference. In any event, if our nation had rec­
ognized it as a blockade, it would have meant recognition of a 
belligerent status, with the attending rights of belligerency on 
both the Red Government and the Nationalist Government---so:me­
thing that our country is not yet ready to accord. Following our 
Government's protest to the Nationalist Government, the Depart­
ment of State issued a notice to American shipping lines that to en­
ter Shanghai or certain other Chinese ports would be at their own 
risk. All American shipping lines, except one, refrained from en­
tering Shanghai. The one line who refused to accede to the admQn• 
ition of the State Department was the Isbrandtsen Company. That 
.particular company, as you read in the papers, continued to send ita 
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ships up the Yangtze·Estuary. Eventually, some of these ships.were 
intercepted and fired upon. Meanwhilf the Isbrandtsen Company 
flooded the State Department and Navy Department with telegrams 
and, letters demanding naval protection to their. vessels. '!,'hey 
argued that since the Government ref used to recognize . the port 
closure, they were within their rights in taking their ships into 
Shanghai. Moreover, they insisted that i.n accordance with Navy 
Regulations, the Navy had the·· mandatory duty of furnishing 
protection to their vessels. The Navy regulations_ specifically in­
voked are the following: 
30 
Article 0620, which reads as follows: 
. 
"So far as lies within his power, acting in conform.ity with 
international law and treaty obligations, the senior officer 
present shall protect all commercial vessels and aircraft of 
the United States in their lawful occupation, and shall ad­
vance the commercial interests of this eountey." 
Article 0614 provides that: 
"l. The use of force by United States naval personnel 
against a friendly foreign state, or against anyone within 
the territories thereof, is illegal. 
2. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which
belongs to states as well as to individuals, and in the case of
· states it includes the protection of the state, its honor, and
its possessions, and · the lives and property of its citizens
against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby
the state or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury.
The conditions calling for the application of the right of 
self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must
be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who
are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible
care and forebearance. In no case shall force be exercised
in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the
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right of self-preservation as above defined. It must be 
used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which 
is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It 
can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment 
for acts already committed. 
3. Whenever, in the application of the above-mentioned
principles, it shall become necessary to land an armed force
in a foreign territory on occasions of political disturbance
where the local authorities are unable to give adequate pro­
tection to life and property, the assent of such ·authorities,
or of some one of them, shall first be obtained, if it can be
done without prejudice to the interests involved."
The Isbrandtsen Company, not satisfied with the replies ob­
tained from the Secretary of the Navy, carried its campaign to the 
press, and bought several full-page ads in the New York Times and 
Washington Post insisting that a mandatory duty lay upon the 
Navy to protect its vessels in that situation. This was followed by 
a letter to the President accusing Admiral Berkey and the 7th Fleet 
of lapping up all the whiskey in Manila instead of performing their 
duties to the Isbrandtsen ships, and demanded the punishment of 
the Secretary of the Navy and the officers responsible by General 
Court Martial. Finally, it appeared that some of the attacks on the 
Isbrandtsen ships took place on the high seas, and Admiral Berkey 
then set up a patrol and drew an arbitrary line westward of which 
our vessels would not off er protection. This line was well outside of 
Chinese territorial waters, anµ was not mearit to be definitive of 
Chinese territorial waters, but simply for patrol purposes. Since 
the establishment of the patrol there have been no further incidents, 
probably because lsbrandtsen has elected to unload its cargoes at 
Tsingtao and Taku · Bar rather than at Shanghai. 
The Navy position, while never publicly expressed, has simply 
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been that the duty to protect the lawful commerce of the United 
States is a discretionary and not a mandatory duty as insisted up­
on by the Isbrandtsen Company. This position is clear from the 
language of the Regulations wherein the words "the conditions call­
ing for the application of the right of self-preservation ... must 
be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers ... " I could 
go at length into the merits and demerits of the Isbrandtsen posi­
tion, our own position and that of the Chinese Nationalist Govern­
ment. However, time does not permit. But I do want to get over to 
you the point of discretionary duty as distinguished from man,. 
datory duty, which is a practical distinction which everyone of you. 
should understand. 
Another current problem pertaining to maritime jurisdic­
tion is that of the submarines of a certain foreign power which per­
sist in hovering off our coasts. In dealing with the problem it has 
been necessary to invoke certain principles of international law. 
Hovering foreign submarines are generally considered to be possi­
ble threats to our national security. We do not question the right 
of innocent passage of foreign submarines through our territorial 
waters. It is our position, however, that if a foreign submarine 
comes within our territorial sea, · she must navigate on the surface 
and. comply with our domestic regulations of navigation. Our re­
quirement in this respect is supported by international'law. Among 
other places, the expression of. the principle may. be found in the 
final Act of the Hague Codification Conference of 1930.  It appears 
that where a foreign submarine hovers off our coasts, submerged or 
surfaced, international law recognizes this as a possible hostile 
threat to our security. Furthermore, international law recognizes 
the inherent right of self-defense of a nation whose security is 
threatened, which means that under the great doctrine of "reason­
ableness" a nation may take reasonable measures to protect its 
security and right of privacy. A noted authority has stated: 
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"Justification of such defensive measures of prevention ... 
rests generally upon the casual connection between acts 
sought to be thwarted and injury otherwise to be antici­
pated from them by the aggrieved State within its terri­
tory. As that connection may be found to exist at varying 
distances from the outer limits of territorial waters, the 
freedom of such a State is not on principle dependent upon 
the precise location of the spot where an offender may be 
apprehended, or upon the possession of the State of a 
special right of control over that spot." (Hyde, Int'l. Law, 
Vol. I, P. 460) 
This is to say that whether the submarine is within or without our 
territorial waters and there is reasonable belief that its actions con­
stitute a threat to our security, we can take reasonable measures, 
including force, to repel that threat. 
It is with_ hope and uncertainty that we are able to view the 
influence which international law may have on the conduct of war in 
the future. It was hoped through the war crimes trials that future 
wars of aggression would cease; it was hoped that prisoners of war 
in the wars of the future would receive more humane treatment by 
their captors. Today, we have Russia who has yet to repatriate all 
of the many prisoners of war she captured during World War II. 
It is known that many of the prisoners she still holds are suffering 
privations and are being used in slave labor battalions. We have 
seen in the past few years how Russia has taken over one nation 
after another. This has been most discouraging, particularly since 
the Russians have participated in the war crimes program them­
selves, and have condemned those acts which they continue to 
commit themselves. However, there is a bright ray of hope-as 
yet there is no shooting war, and the Russians are sensitive to 
world opinion. For that re�son you find them using the United 
Nations as a forum to justify their position and acts before the 
,..,. 
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world. As mentioned before, the Russians refused to-participate 
··in the Stockholm Prisoner of War Conference. However,
they finally signed the Geneva Convention of 1949. when
the chips were down. The standards set in these Con-.
ventions cannot help but have an improved effect on the
treatment of Prisoners of War in the future. Strategic plan­
ners of all nations will most certainly take account of these facts'. 
The one great fear I have is the /world wide efforts of Russia to
install communist regimes in all countries. It is forseeable that
with continued success they might in time control a majority of 
the votes in the United Nations and thus try to cloak their infamy
with the aegis of legal authority. However remote, it is still a
possibility unless we keep militarily strong, and assist the peace"
loving democracies back to economic stability.
Our lease base agreements with the United Kingdom still 
have 90 years to run before they expire. In the event of a future 
war these. bases will become bastions of defense for this country. 
The international law that governs their use is found in treaty, the 
so-called lease base agreements 
In the event of another war, the former Japanese, mandated 
islands of the Pacific; which · are now being administered by the 
Trusteeship Agreement· with the United Nations, having already 
been declared strategic areas, will be used as military and naval 
bases, subject to the rules set forth in the Trusteeship Agreement: 
It is my own belief that international law has made rapid 
progress in its development during the past few years. Certainly, 
. I 
as of today this nation and the world stands in a far better position, 
insofar as international law is concerned, in the event of future war 
than it did in 1939. We now have on the public record certain 
standards of treatment of prisoners of war and civilians universally 
approved from the humanitarian standpoint. We have a United 
34 RESTRICTED 
36
Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 5, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss5/1
Nations which is struggling to perpetuate peace, but which in the 
eveµt of war, can exercise a strong moral force that will go far to 
restrain irresponsible conduct in the waging of a war. Lastly, we 
have the International Court of Justice, which if properly imple­
mented, may one day be able to enf ore� standards of conduct which
humanity insists must be maintained in the conduct of war. 
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ECONOMIC ELEMENTS OF U. S. WAR POTENTIAL 
A lecture delivered by 
Dr. Bertrand Fox 
at the Naval War College 
October 6, 1949 
My topic this morning is "Economic Elements of the U. S. 
War Potential." As you can·imagine, it is a tremendous topic and 
I am going to have to skim fairly lightly and rapidly over many 
phases of it. I will talk in fairly general terms and hope that vari­
ous specific details can be brought out later in the question period. 
I want to deal with the topic in three major headings and, if there 
is time, to add one additional topic. 
My first of the three headings is "The determinants of maxi­
mum overall production potential." The first point I want to 
make is to dispose of money. In peacetime, the magnitude of what 
is produced in the aggregate, and for any particular segment of the 
ecomomy the maximum of a given thing that can be produced, de­
pends upon money demand. Therefore, we think of money as be­
ing of tremendous importance to the volume of production. In war 
time, however, if the country is solidly behind you, there is no 
problem of appropriations such as you have in peacetime. There 
is no problem that is really difficult relative to raising the money 
to buy what has to be produced. The government will provide the 
demand with money that can come either through taxes, borrow­
ing, or if necessary, various other inflationary means. 
Money itself is not a limiting factor in war production­
that is something that can be disposed of fairly easily. We do use 
money, howeve;, as a general measure, and I will keep referring 
today to a particular magnitude that we call gross national product, 
Doctor Fox is professor of Business Administration at Harvard Uni­
versity. He has been a consultant to the Munitions Board and Na­
tional Security Resources Board since 1947. 
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which is the sum total in value terms of all the goods and services 
produced in this country. That is the measure we use of the total 
level of pl'()duction. It is measured in terms of money because you 
cannot add tanks, ships, and yards of cloth. We have to have a 
common denominator, and for this we use money. But as far as I 
a.m �oncerned and from the point of view of this presentation, we 
can dispose of money. 
The real determinants of production come down to the basic 
and physical factors of production, and I want to deal with each very 
rapidly. First, the human factor-labor. Out of any given popu­
lation, the labor force actually is a small fraction-less than half. 
Out of our population today of approximately one hundred forty to 
one hundred forty-five million people, OU:f labor force. is somewhere 
around sixty to sixty-five million people. Now the magnitude of 
the labor force depends on the composition of the population. Rus­
sia with a much larger population has a smaller labor force. They 
are in a stage of a rapidly growing population. We are in a stage. 
of greater stability of population1 The greater the stability of 
the population, the less rapid is the growth, hence the larger is 
the proportion which is in the working age group. So you have to 
consider not only the population, but also its age distribution and 
its composition. Our labor force today is somewhere around sixty­
two to sixty-five million people. 
The second element we have to think of is the degree of 
employment of that labor force. We hear all kinds of talk of 
"full employment". The term "full employment" is· really "high 
level employment". If we ever reached a point of full employment, 
our whole system would be completely. rigid with no mobility or 
flexibility. Full employment really implies: "With a sixty million 
labor force-somewhere around one to two million unemployed." 
They were the float. That's the group that provides the flexibility 
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to shift from job to job as the production of certain things is 
stepped· up and other things are curtailed. 
In war time, at the peak of employment during World War 
II, we got down to a figure of a.bout eight hundred thousand un­
employed. At that stage our whole system was tight and rigid. 
The problem of staffing various munitions lines which were on the 
upswing, of transferring workers from the lines where production 
was to decline to those where we needed more workers was a ter­
ribly difficult job with that degree of unemployment. Ordinarily 
we need somewhat more than that to provide the flexibility re­
quired in a changing production pattern. 
The third element is the amount of time workers are em­
ployed. Here, I think, today the average work week, taking days 
off and things of that kind, is somewhere around 35 hours a week. 
I think the standard forty-hour week now has gone by the boards 
somewhat. With that length work week, again we have more 
flexibility for expansion, because the stepping-up of the work week 
is easier. If we are already working a 48 or 54 hour week, the 
possibility of flexibility to step it up is much more limited. In the 
last war we had an average increase in hours per worker of up to
25 to 35 per cent, because we had that flexibility. There is not 
that same flexibility in nations which are already working the much 
longer work week. 
In addition to those broad elements in the labor force. we 
have to think:'" of a special problem in wartime, because probably 
the most able and the most vigorous of the labor force is drained 
into the military service. Also in wartime, the need for particular 
kinds of skill is much greater. The shift is to hard goods pro­
duction and out of soft goods. The need for mechanical skills is 
much greater. But again, those same skills are needed in the 
armed forces, and the problem in wartime to get those particular 
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skills-to get them in the places where they are needed--,-is extreme­
ly difficult. The training problem in wartime-the training of the 
type of workers which are needed for the particular production line, 
is one of the most difficult of the mobilization problem. 
In addition we must consider a particular kind of labor group 
-the supervisory skills. In our mass production type industry, the
supervisors play a very important role. Again they are the same
type who make good non-coms and good officers. They are taken
rapidly, and the upgrading that goes on to get the required super­
visory personnel in production, raises very difficult problems. We
could go on to many other aspects of that, but I have to skim
lightly.
The second major factor is natural resources. And again 
I want to mention two specifically-agricultural land is the first. 
In a war period, the need for food is considerably greater for the 
same group of people eating than it is in peacetime. Believe it or 
not, the military consumption of food per capita is considerably 
greater than civilian consumption per capita. In wartime the shift 
in production is to hard goods production. With more vigorous 
work, the need of food per person is greater. Again, almost inevit­
ably, you have an inflationary pressure during the war. People 
have more money to spend. They want more food. For exam­
ple, back in 1939 there were about 47 per cent of the families in the 
United States whose annual income was one thousand dollars per 
year or less. During the war this average income almost doubled. 
I assure you there is considerable room for an expansion of diet 
when you start with a family earning a thousand dollars a year. 
Hence the need for agricultural land, because of the greater 
pressure on agricultural land during a war period, is very great, 
and the food problem in war is of very great importance.· 
Second, a general group of things you have heard much 
about already-materials. Most of the talk of materials before the 
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last war, and still to a considerable extent today, is in terms of a 
group which we call strategic or critical materials. To my mind 
they are infinitely less important than another group. No nation 
can be a strong industrial· nation and a strong war power without 
what I think of as basic materials-steel, copper, aluminum, rubber, 
the chemical industry, oil (natural or synthetic), and power. These 
are the key materials-the key resources, as far as the war econ­
omy is concerned, and to my mind considerably more attention 
should be given to the readiness of these material industries in 
peace time as a possible preparation for war than to give almost 
exclusive concern to the strategic and critical list where stock­
piling is the temporary solution. 
The third major factor is productive equipment-industrial 
plant and machinery. In this country we have a larger volume of 
machinery and equipment per worker than in any other country 
in the world, an.d it accounts for our very great productivity per 
man. Our productivity is about twice that of the highest Euro­
pean country. During the war, in .comparison with Russia, we had 
about three to four times the productivity per man, and about five 
to six times the productivity per man as compared to Japan. That 
is largely accounted for by the machinery and equipment which each 
man has to use, and also by the skills with which the men are co­
ordinated and the production process is integrated. Production 
equipment of all kinds is a yery key element, but there is . one in 
particular that I want to emphasize. That is the machine tool in­
dustry, which makes the machines which produce the goods we 
want. We have the largest and most highly efficient machine 
tool industry in the world. If we are going to have the possibility of 
shifting production lines from one product to another, in which we 
have to retool, then if the machine tool industry is not up to snuff, 
our flexibility is greatly limited. We have heard the term "armed 
in depth". Armed economically in depth is of equal importance, 
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·· and for that we need a machine tool industry. The shift, for ex-' ·
ample, from the B-17 to the B-29 would have been impossible with­
out an effective machine tool industry because the tooling had to be
completely different. Practically all tools, that is the big machine
tools, were scrapped from the B-17 lines when the B-29's came in.
Where rapid shifts are required to improved types of muni­
tions, they can be produced only if we have the tools. If we have 
an effective machine tool industry, such shifts can be made rap­
idly, as they were. To my mind, Russia's greatest weakness at the 
moment is its lack of a really first class machine tool industry. Dur­
ing the last war we provided the bulk of their machine tools. Today· 
they are doing everything possible to get machine tools from us. But 
the idea is to have the "know-how" to make the tools, to make the 
things we want, and that is a very critical element in our war po­
tential. 
Another element is the size of our preduction units. This 
question of the size of the largest units, creates all kinds of prob­
lems of control of industry, charges of monopoly, and things of that 
type. But in wartime, I can assure you, they are a boon, because 
the large production units have a facility for organizing big produc­
tion jobs and for integrating all of the steps in the production pro­
c�ss. Giving a contract to a large unit like General Motors means 
that you put on the shoulders of General Motors the problem of in­
tegrating a production job, in lining up the subcontractors, in lining 
up the materials, and getting all the'parts of it tied in together. If 
that had to be done almost entirely from a central point, the control 
job would be almost impossible; hence time after time, during the 
war, many thanks were given for the size of many of our production 
units. 
A fourth factor, and one of vital importance is managerial, 
ability. This comes down to the skill of integrating the various 
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other produ�tion factors, in devising. means by which they can· be 
made more effective, and. in supervising and integrating the whole 
flow of the production process. We are again very fortunate in 
our type of economic system to have probably the best·. training 
ground possible for the development of ·managers. . Our skill at 
management· and oqr management "know-how" are the envy of 
the world. Without that "know-how" in management techniques, 
our whole system would be considerably less effective. And that 
consists, to a very great extent, in the ability to break a job up into 
its detailed component parts, .and to be. able to fit men and machines 
to a job iii the most effective fashion. Where you have the prob­
lem of many l;VOrkers being unskilled and not trained for a particu­
lar' job. in war time, the need for breaking each task up· into its sim­
plest elements is of even greater importance than in peace time. And 
the fact �hat our management techniques, our production tech a. 
niques of a mass production character, do break complicated jobs up 
into simple elements, meant that the problem of training :workers 
was considerably easier. 
. . . 
Finally, one additional point is research-scientific ability, 
scientific skills and technological research. "If you don't keep up, 
you are lost." At various- times you have heard that phrase. You 
have to either be ahead scientifically, o.r lose. New production tech­
niques, new weapons, new materials, new ways to substitute for 
things· that are scarce, all are a part of the technological scientific 
problem which I just want to mention as vital. 
Those in general are the fundamental factors, the basic f ac­
tors, which determine the maximum to which our economy. could go 
in reaching its top. How do we attain it? What are the measures 
to attain maximum: production in war time? The first thing I want 
to point out is that we cannot rely on the type of incentives and 
motives that exist in peace time. In peace time, our system is what 
we. call "a profit economy". Resources, both human and physic�l, 
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move into those lines . of production whic:ti offer the· possibility · of 
the greatest return. If a thing is scarce in relation to what people 
want, there is a tendency to bid its price up, to make that line more 
profitable. Additional firms come into the business or old firms 
expand. Perhaps the possibility opens of paying higher wages to 
. attract more workers ; hence the incentives for movement of re­
sources in a peace time system is the opportunity of greater wages, 
greater profits, and a greater return per capita. We cannot rely 
. on that in war time. The problem in war time is the shift from 
peace time pursuits to munitions production. True, the govern­
ment, in buying munitions may quote a. price which offers a better­
than�average profit and which enables the new munitions lines to 
off er ,higher wages to attract workers. To an extent, that type of 
natural or normal incentive �an be used, but it is limited for this 
reason. As �e pay more to workers and as equipment gets a great­
er return, they have · greater income. But at the. same time re­
_sources are shifted. from peace time prod�cts, hence the supply of 
those products is reduced. If incomes are higher, people can buy 
more. Tlie inevitable result is that the prices of peace time products 
will tend to rise, and we are back in the same place we started, be­
cause then those producers can raise wages to attract workers and 
resources are. attracted back again. Or, it becomes a kind of a 
"step" proposition with greater and greater inflation. We cannot 
rely solely on the profit motive in war time to get the shift of re­
sources needed. Secondly, there is a natural apathy to shift to 
munitions industries for a war period of indeterminate length from 
a line of work·that you are used to and to which you want to re­
turn after the war. No worker with an established home wants 
to uproot himself .and his family and move to the new areas of 
munitions production, which perhaps are on the coast or far away 
from his old home in new areas where housing is not adequate. It 
. takes a very major incentive to get those shifts. We have to rely 
on something more than the normal incentives of. peace time pro-
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RESTRICTED 
duction. We have to establish central controls, and the controls 
have to be operated ·from a central point in order to force the 
necessary shifts. 
Now what controls are needed, and what is the objective of 
the use of such controls? The first stage of the process is the cen­
tral plan. In a war time picture, especially today, it is a problem 
of planning for the utilization of total resources. It is not sim­
ply a question of a military production plan. It is a control plan 
for the entire economy, It is a total-control program. The first 
stage of it, of course, is the formulation of military requirements 
-the traiislation of the strategic and operational plans into logis­
tic requirements, and these in turn into production requirements
for the various types of munitions and allied products required. But
in the formulation of the overall plan, I would like to stress very
strongly, that there is great need for integrated individual plans
developed cooperatively and simultaneously, involving three ele­
ments-namely, the strategic and logistic elements; second, the
economic elements, involving what resources are available and how
they can be mobilized or utilized; and third, the political elements.
The latter involves questions of what kind of an economy we are
going to have, the degree of belt-tightening possible and still retain
a healthy civilian economy, the possibility of war time and post-war
stability, and the effects of various actions on the ultimate trans.;
ition to the postwar semi-normalcy. The three types of decisions,
the three types of plans must be developed simultaneously, con­
currently and. cooperatively; The time wasted in World War II, in
separate planning and in a kind of a resistance towards working
together intimately between the political groups-represented
primarily by the President and Congress-the civilian production
groups�the War Production Board, the Office of War Mobiliza'­
tion, etc.-and the military services, cost us a great deal of time and
many- errors. Today, the organization, at least, for mobilization
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planning, the National Security Resources Board and the National 
Security Council, provides for that mutual exc'hange. I want to em­
phasize very strongly that that is the only way in which the plan· 
can be developed most effectively. We must have a unity in the 
planning groups and an. intimate interchange of ideas as the basis 
on which the total plan is to be developed.· 
Even so, the first to be developed must be the military plan: 
That, in turn, has to be judged against the availability of resources 
of the particular kinds required, when and where, plus the general 
political appraisal as to how much and how fast the civilian econ­
omy is to 'be disrupted. Perhaps we discover that the military pro­
gram can be achieved as it stands. Perhaps modifications are nec­
essary, and then it is a process of steady give and take. The size 
of the program, military or otherwise, has to be large enough to. 
provide a real incentive to get the wheels going hard and fast At 
the same time, it can't be so large that we have to commit all of our 
resources in a rigid program at once with insufficient flexibility for 
later adjustment and change. Change in war time is inevitable. We 
have to have some flexibility to make those changes, yet the entire 
1;>rogram must be large enough to provide the drive to achieve maxi­
mum production. President Roosevelt, in his message in early 1942, 
called for the production in 1942 of sixty thousand planes, forty­
five thousand tanks, a huge number of ships and other munitions in 
balance. He· called for one hundred twenty-five thousand planes 
and seventy-five thousand tanks in 1943. These goods were so huge 
that everybody practically threw in the sponge until they saw he 
meant it, and then they got behind it That was the inceJ.!tive pro­
gram, the high goal, that was needed at that stage to really get ac­
tion and the economy mobilized. As far as numbers are concerned, 
neither goal was achieved. But if you want to add, for instance, 
the pounds of aircraft in the type of planes that were in existence 
in 1942 when he made the statement, both of those goals were ex-
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ceeded by the weight of aircraft actually produced. But in the in­
terval, there were so many changes, such as increased weight of 
planes and types of planes, ships and tanks, that as far as the num­
bers went, the goals were not reached. 
Once a program is established, the control system has to be 
geared and meshed into that. That requires a variety of things. 
One is a series of limitation orders. Generally the only way in 
which we can get shifts of resources is to prohibit the production 
of the things frpm which we want resources to move, so we say, 
"No more automobiles." When you can produce no more automobiles, 
the automobile manufacturers and workers will willingly produce 
munitions. 
The first set of controls, then, is limitation orders, either 
prohibiting the production of an end-item or §topping the use of 
a particular type of material in the end-item which often stops pro­
duction. 
Second, are established priorities which direct the flow of 
components, materials and equipment to particular products which 
are most in demand. If the supply of a material is greater than 
the demand for it in high priority stuff, the demands of the key 
items can be met . by simple priorities. As soon, however, as the 
total priority demands equal the 'total supply or exceed it, priorities 
will no longer do the job of material control. Then you have to in­
stitute an allocation system-a detailed precise system of alloca­
tions to direct the flow of particular amounts of a material, so 
many tons of steel or pounds of aluminum to each particular end use. 
When things get even tighter, at. times we have to use also pro­
duction scheduling to take into account in more detail the needs 
of each particular production line, so that no matter how urgently 
the end product is needed, we don't flow more to its production than 
can be used. These comprise a very tight, integrated set of pro-
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duction controls, but a variety of others have to be used to direct 
. the economy, such as monetary controls, fiscal controls, price con­
trols, rationing and man power controls, and these must be in­
tegrated in with the material and resources controls. 
Typically, it is easier to control the flow of materials and 
to establish programs in terms of a common denominator of ma­
terials than in terms of man power or in terms of. price and so on. 
These other controls, therefore, must be integrated into the pro­
duction control system rather than vice versa. That integration 
was never successful in World War II, and is one that is being 
studied very carefully now. 
Two other things should be mentioned briefly in the steps 
to achieve maximum output. One is, what is the information you 
have to have to run this set of controls, this central planning? In 
any business you have a detailed accounting system and a set of 
internal records. General statistics are to the economy what ac­
counting or bookkeeping data are to an individual business. But 
the problems of obtaining statistical data from the economy as a 
whole are infinitely greater and present some of the greatest dif­
ficulties in central planning. Peace time mobilization planning 
should keep alive the statistical and informational tools, in order 
that decisions can be made most easily when needed. 
Finally, the personnel in the central planning group must be 
considered. There is no ideal peace time training to provide per­
sonnel for the planning which is needed in war time. The problems 
are over-all in character. Most of our business executives think 
too narrowly in terms of their own business and its problems. Here 
the problem is the integration of steel with machine tools, with 
tanks, with ships, with allocations, with rationing, and so on. It
is a broad overall conception. We don't train men that way. They 
must, in addition, have great versatility and be able to shift rapid-
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ly from one' problem to another. Third, they. have to be able to 
_work eff ectiv'ely under pressure, including the intense pressure 
of criticism. They have to be able to make those tough decisions. 
They have to have the guts to do it and to do it fast. They have 
to have the ability to appraise a situation realistically even 
though they realize that they can't get all the information that 
is needed to make the best decisions. Nevertheless they must 
make the 'decisions with what information they have, and make 
them_ fast. More production men and less salesmen are needed in 
the lower echelons. The tire problem, one of the meanest during 
the war, was run by a group of salesmen for a time. Everyone was 
dissatisfied., A top-flight production man was recruited and things 
cleared right up. One of the toughest problems therefore, is to 
get the right type of personnel to run the top planning effort. 
The last general point I want to discuss is, "How large 
a proportion· of this total production potential can be devoted to ·· 
war?" In part, that is a political decision, but one point we have . 
to keep clearly in our minds. If the munitions production is to be at 
its maximum, there must be a healthy civilian economy and war- · 
supporting economy. Without it the efficiency of munitions pro­
duction will decline., The difficulty is to determine what might be 
called the marginal degrees of essentiality of various. parts of the 
military, war-supporting and civilian programs and they vary with 
the stage of the war effort. If you take the position of "no 
sacrifice for sacrifice sake but only when needed," then in the 
earlier stages of a war production effort, the limiting factor is gen-­
erally machine tools. At that time all machine tools are diverted 
to munitions. Civilian production isn't hurt, but it can't grow 
easily. 
The second stage is generally critical materials-usually 
hard material such as steel, copper, aluminum, and zinc. At that 
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stage, the production of civilian hard products is cut. That, 
again, does not hurt the standard of living too much. True, civil­
ians can't get a new automobile, refrigerator, or radio, but they 
can get enough food, clothing, etc. 
The real pinch comes when the limiting factor becomes man 
power. Then the shortage becomes general. At that stage the most 
difficult allocation problems are reached. That is the stage we 
had reached early in 1945, and things really looked tough for the 
central control agencies. Up to that point the allocation problem was 
not impossible. 
The difficulty arises because there are no guides which can 
be used to determine those degrees of essentiality. You have to 
play by ear to judge the problem. Our most effective instrument 
was .what we called the "squealometer". If in the process of an 
alllocation or program determination, we achieved a uniform 
pitch of ''.squeal" from all parties, we thought that the allocation had 
been successful. On the other hand, too often there was an at­
tempt to increase pure munitions production at the expense of 
the war-supporting activities, and we found that by starving the 
railroads of steel plate to make additional tank cars, freight 
cars, and box cars, we really ran into trouble in the latter part of 
the war. Then it had to be diverted out of munitions to such uses 
in order to keep munitions rolling into the seaports. 
At the peak of war production only about forty-five to 
forty-eight per cent of steel output was devoted to pure munitions 
production, but out of a total of about 65 million tons per year of 
finished steel products, probably only about 20 thousand tons went 
to pure civilian uses. The rest was of a war-supporting charac­
ter, going for additional oil production, for rails, for maintenance, 
repair, and operating supplies, for war related construction, for 
electric power-all required to produce munitions and transport 
them. 
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,There is one additional point that I" want to make in this 
connection. The length of time that is allowed to "reach peak pro­
ductic�n is all-important in this type of decision. If there is time, 
. it is possible to devote some steel and other critical materials to the 
production of additional steel plants. However, it takes about 
2½ tons of steel to build the capacity for one additional ton per 
year .. · If there is time, it is possible to make the decision to build 
more steel capacity. If there is not time, we can't afford to· de'­
vote steel for the production of more steel or other types of ma..: 
terial. So, time is a critical factor. in those decisions. Only if yeu 
have time, is it possible to build more capacity to meet the peak 
demands at a later stage. 
I am not going to have time to go into the role of the 
peace time planning agencies, but I do want to make one or· two final 
points here. 
I have taiked about the resources to achieve the maximum 
potential. I want to emphasize one or two final ones, which seem of 
great importance to me. We talk largely about things that per­
haps we can put in balance sheets and use to compare one country 
with another, such as facilities, materials, and things like that, 
_all of which are very important. But, when the real, all-out pinch 
comes, the key factors become things which we cannot put into 
balance .sheets. Then it comes down to human factors and morale 
factors, which include the effectiveness of those who are guiding 
both the overall ·effort as well as the segments of that effort in 
industry itself; their skill at integrating and coordinating the 
production lines ; the brains and intelligence they have ; their skill 
in devising production techniques, new ways of saving materials 
and things of that kind; their skills to improvise, to substitute, 
to find new and better ways of doing things. In other words, it 
comes down in part to the effectiveness of management, both in 
individual plants and in the central planning agencies. 
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Second, and perhaps more important is the morale of the 
working force and the morale of the bosses of production jobs. 
Jf their heart is solidly behind the job they are dding, if they 
· are convinced that the job they are doing is as important or more
important than anything else, if they have confidence that what
they are producing is going to be used effectively by the military
services and not wasted, the effectiveness of their work will be
greatly enhanced. Their confidence in the use being made of the
products they are producing is vital to the morale and the effective­
ness of the production effort. The activities of the services relative
to worker morale in the form of incentive programs· are extremely
important, but there was an awful lot of muttering and grumbling
later in the war in many areas. If the people as a whole are
solidly behind the production effort and morale is high, then in our
type of system, we can really go to town. If morale isn't high,
we will lose some of the power and drive behind that effort. It
comes down to the degree of unity behind the job that they are do­
ing. If the people feel no immediate danger of attack and are not
afraid, if they . are seeing in the headlines that things are going
fine, and if they have money in their pockets-more money than
they ever had in · thejr lives before......;.they want to spend it and 
they don't want to work in an all-out fashion. That is the time 
morale counts in keeping the drive and the pressure behind the 
job. In the last analysis wheft the pinch is really on, it's the 
morale factor, it's the heart and the will of the people doing the 
job that becomes the key factor in our war potential. 
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